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Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) experienced an unprecedented wave of non-sectarian 
anti-government protests in 2014. Although the key motivating factors generally 
highlighted such as economic marginalization and poor governance were common 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the protests did not extend to all parts of the 
country. Notably, despite very similar initial conditions in the two jurisdictions of the 
country, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) saw major unrest with a 
large number of participants in many locations while subsequent protest mobilization 
was much more limited in the Republic of Srpska (RS). We take advantage of the 
variation in the responses from the two governments in the same country to evaluate 
how observed and anticipated government responses can shape the willingness to join 
dissident activity. We argue that variation in government responses and its impact on 
perceptions on prospects for successful collective action can help account for the 
differences in mobilization across the two entities. We test our expectations using a 
new data set on protest events, participants and government responses in BiH from 
January to April 2014. Our findings are consistent with the argument that coherent 
repressive government policies tend to suppress mobilization, while mixes of 
repressive responses and concessions from the government can encourage further 
mobilization. The results for FBiH show clear variation in protest following changes 
in government behavior, and are consistent the claim that repressive responses likely 





In early 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a period of extensive large-scale 
anti-government protest following initial demonstrations and riots in the town of 
Tuzla on 5 February (Sadiković 2014: 71). The 2014 protests in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were unusual in that mobilization focused on dissatisfaction over the 
widespread economic marginalization and generally poor governance in the country 
rather than the cleavages between the three main ethnic groups - i.e., Bosniaks, Croats 
and Serbs. As such, the largely non-sectarian 2014 protests presented a clear 
departure from the dominant ethnic narrative that has been seen as characteristic of 
the country since the prior civil war (see Beber 2006, 2014). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has a unique political structure with two largely 
autonomous governing units, namely the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(FBiH) and the Republic of Srpska (RS). As we will show in more detail later, similar 
initial social and economic conditions in the two units provide a clear common 
motivation for grievances against the government in both jurisdictions. Yet, only in 
the FBiH did the initial 2014 protest escalate into major mobilization, while the RS 
did not see the same degree of mass unrest. We argue that role of observed and 
anticipated government responses in shaping individual perceptions of the prospects 
for successful collective action and hence their willingness to join in dissent can 
account for the differences in mobilization across the two entities. In particular, we 
argue that an inconsistent mix of accommodative and repressive responses in FBiH 
increased individual expectations about the efficacy of protests and hence their 
willingness to participate in dissent, while the consistent repressive responses in RS 
quashed hopes for concessions to protest and undermined individual participation and 
growth in mobilization.  
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Out propositions build on an extensive body of prior theoretical and empirical 
interest research on how differences in government responses affect mobilization (see, 
e.g., Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010; Klandermans 1984; Lichbach 1987; Rasler 
1996). However, the unique dual government structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
provides an exceptional case to directly examine the impact of differences in 
government responses for participation and expectations. The widespread, social and 
economic problems faced by the population at large are similar throughout the 
country. The unusual political and administrative division between the two parts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides us with two distinct yet comparable cases with 
partly independent government responses. This allows us to observe how different 
observed and expected government responses can affect popular mobilization, while 
holding constant plausible grievances and initial conditions.  
Our study uses a new event dataset that we have collected on the protest in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina over the period January-April 2014, using local news media 
sources. These have much greater coverage than what would be available if we relied 
only on information taken from English language media reports. Our event data also 
record government responses to individual events and allow us evaluate 
systematically our propositions on how government repression and accommodation 
will affect subsequent mobilization or level of contentious collective action. Unlike 
other time-series analysis of individual countries we can consider actual variation in 
government responses across two different jurisdictions within the same country, thus 
plausibly holding a number of other simultaneous and contextual factors constant 
when making comparisons. To anticipate our findings, the results from our empirical 
analysis are consistent with the argument that the use of consistent repressive policies 
in the RS likely suppressed contentious activity and mobilization, while an 
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inconsistent mix of repressive and accommodative policies in the FBiH encouraged 
contentious activity and mobilization. 
We first provide a brief overview of the 2014 protests in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and the historical background and motivation for the protests. We then 
highlight the divergent patterns of mobilization, contrasting the escalating mass-
mobilization in the FiBH with the lack of major mobilization in RS. We show more 
formally how the salience of grievances per se does not provide a plausible 
explanation for the divergent patterns. We argue that differences in the responses by 
the different governments and their effects on individual mobilization provide a more 
plausible explanation for the divergent events, supported by our new data and 
qualitative evidence.  
 
Grievances and opportunities in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina  
The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) aimed to establish peace and democratic 
rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the DPA clearly succeeded in ending the 
devastating civil war the country and preventing a recurrence of armed violence, 
neither of the two semi-independent entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that resulted 
from the agreement – i.e., the FBiH and the RS – have seen much progress in either 
sustained economic reconstruction or developing effective governance. The 
unfinished transition to a fully functional independent and democratic state after the 
DPA has left individual citizens in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina with very 
little space to play a meaningful active role in politics, beyond casting votes at regular 
elections. After the initial social and economic devastation of the civil war in the 
1990s, citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina have continued to endure widespread 
poverty, severe unemployment, political ineffectiveness and very high levels of 
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corruption over the last two decades (see Beber 2006; Mujanovic and McRobie 2014; 
Pugh 2005).  
The 2014 protests were very much rooted in political and economic grievances 
rather than the ethnic cleavages that often have been seen as dominating politics in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most proximate triggering events arose over a 
breakdown in labor relations, which in turn was a consequence of the privatization of 
the former state-owned factories which left many workers throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina unemployed, stripped of assets, in debt, and without access to health 
care or key social benefits (Šunj 2014). More specifically, workers at the Dita 
detergent factory in the northern city of Tuzla in the FBiH had threatened the 
government with the strike action since 2009. They initiated their first actual strike in 
August 2011 over claims that the company owed its employees 7 months of unpaid 
salaries as well as 22 months of pension and health insurance payments (Busuladžić 
2014: 15). After the first strike, workers at the Dita factory were joined by employees 
of other former state-owned companies such as the Konjuh furniture factory in the 
nearby town of Živinice, as well as the Guming motor firm and the Poliohem 
chemical plant in Tuzla (Arsenijević 2014). Beyond the grievances by workers 
against these specific firms, the protests were also directed against the government 
and the highly non-transparent privatization policies that had led to job losses and 
layoffs, as well as the fact that some of the companies were seen as been given 
favorable treatment and been allowed to declare bankruptcy (Radio Sarajevo 2014). 
All the key political institutions in BiH largely ignored the plight of the workers 
throughout 2013. This reflected in part the common perception that there was little 
threat of protest escalation, even if the broader grievances and views expressed by the 
workers might be widely shared by other segments of the population. 
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However, on 5 February 2014 the workers’ movement in Tuzla successfully 
managed to mobilize over 1000 people to demonstrate in front of the local cantonal 
government. This largely nonviolent march on the local authority headquarters in 
Tuzla was followed by thousands of protesters in the streets of 24 towns and cities 
across the country over the next couple of days, including the capital Sarajevo as well 
as major cities such as Banja Luka, Brcko, Jajce, Mostar, and Zenica, (Cihan News 
Agency 2014; Dnevni Avaz 2014; Haber 2014; Marzal 2014; Milan 2014). Although 
there were some minor and isolated violent acts by the protesters, the mobilization in 
the BiH against the government was largely non-violent. Moreover, there was 
increasing evidence of dissident organization and coordination as the events unfolded 
(De Noni 2014). After some government buildings were set on fire in early February 
2014, many protesters turned out to clear debris to show that they were prepared to 
“clean up this mess, like we'll clean up the politicians who made this happen".1 
Furthermore, it was clear that the protest enjoyed widespread support. A poll carried 
out by the news portal Klix (2014) on 12 February 2014, one week after the first 
events in the mass mobilization, showed very high support for the anti-government 
protest among a majority of the population through Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
However, the subsequent escalation in popular mobilization in the FBiH did 
not extend to the RS. Despite some early minor protests in the RS capital city of 
Banka Luka, the incipient popular uprising in RS remained at a very low level of 
mobilization throughout the entire period of the 2014 protests (Arsenijević 2014). 
This is at first a surprising outcome, since the basis for the grievances and 
opportunities for mobilization would seem very similar across the two jurisdictions. 
                                                 
1 See http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-bosnia-unrest-idUKBREA160VJ20140208. 
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Many perspectives on mobilization highlight the material basis of grievances, 
and how this can give rise to alienation and frustration that in turn motivates 
individual action and support the growth of broader social movements (see, e.g., Gurr 
1970; Kerpelman 1969; LeBon 1896; Landsberger 1976). However, although existing 
economic data and estimates suggest pervasive marginalization in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, they provide little basis for clearly worse conditions or likely grievances 
being notably stronger in the FBiH than the RS.  According to the Labor Force 
Survey’s (2014) official statistics we see very high unemployment rates in both of the 
units, i.e., 28.4% in the FBiH and 25.7% in the RS. Although the rate in FBiH is 
marginally higher, unemployment rates in excess of 25% are very high in absolute 
terms by comparison to other countries in Europe, and even above the unemployment 
rate for Greece typically considered extreme. An effort to derive a composite index of 
social exclusion, based on the risk of poverty, financial depravation, and employment 
security estimates, suggests that half of the BiH population is socially marginalized, 
with an estimated percentage excluded population at 52.6% for RS and 45.6% in the 
FBiH (Ceriani and Laderchi 2015: 16). By this measure, the levels of social exclusion 
seem high in absolute terms across the two units, and if anything higher in RS than 
FBiH. Moreover, the high social exclusion is long-standing, and there is also no 
evidence suggesting dramatic social or economic changes immediately prior to 2014 
in the FBiH relative to the RS. 
With regards to more political grievances, most observers agree that similar 
clientelistic rule with ineffective and corrupt bureaucracies have been prevalent and 
had similar effects across the two different jurisdictions in of the country. There is 
also no clear ethnic bias in political and economic marginalization, which affects in 
individuals in the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb communities alike. The common 
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motivations and efforts to mobilize all ethnic groups across the ethnic divides that had 
dominated in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the civil war were explicitly highlighted 
by the protesters themselves. In fact, the protesters used the chant “we are hungry in 
all three official state languages” to demonstrate the common and cross-ethnic bases 
of their grievances (E.S. 2014; International Crisis Group 2014).  
Beyond the similarities in plausible motivation, there are also no obvious 
differences in factors affecting opportunities for mobilization between the two units 
that can explain the divergent outcomes. For example, it is commonly argued that 
collective action is more difficult across ethnic groups and that the barriers to non-
sectarian mobilization thus should be higher in ethnically divided societies, with 
mistrust across ethnic groups (see Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, 2003). However, this 
would imply that mobilization should be easier in the more ethnically homogenous 
RS than the more heterogeneous FBiH, where the protest grew the most. Moreover, 
there are no obvious differences when it comes to the structure and the influence of 
the pre-existing formal political organizations, such as labor unions or non-
governmental organizations, or informal social networks that may facilitate collective 
between the two jurisdictions (see Fischer 2006).  
Given these general similarities in the initial conditions and the cross-ethnic 
composition of the protesters, it is difficult to see how variation in structural 
conditions and grievances specific to individual ethnic groups can suffice to explain 
the different trajectories we observe in the evolution of the protests across the two 
semi-independent entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Instead, we turn to the different 
government and opposition conflict dynamics unfolding in the FBiH and in RS during 
the initial months of the 2014 uprising. Drawing on prior research by Cunningham 
and Beaulieu (2010), Klandermans (1984), Lichbach (1987) and Rasler (1996), we 
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posit that the differences in government responses and how these affect peoples’ 
perceptions of the prospects for successful collective action and the likelihood that 
others will participate can account for the differences in observed mobilization 
patterns in the FBiH and RS. In particular, accommodating government responses that 
increase expectations about the efficacy of mass mobilization will affect the 
willingness of others to join ongoing dissent once we see initial mobilization. By 
contrast, repressive responses are likely to reinforce beliefs that dissent is unlikely to 
be effective and undermine individual willingness to participate. As such, government 
responses to dissent and protest play a crucial role in either increasing or decreasing 
subsequent mobilization, depending on how individual protest is met, or how 
protesters expect the government to respond to dissent. We argue that the consistent 
repressive government responses in the RS undermined any hope for success or more 
general optimistic expectations about the ability to obtain political demands through 
protests. By contrast, the mix of repressive and accommodative responses seen for the 
FBiH government helped increase the willingness of individuals to participate in 
protest as they became persuaded that protest could be effective, in the sense of 
helping to promote their political goals and that their participation could encourage 
other individuals to participate.  
 
Grievances, collective action, and mobilization in dissent 
Olson (1965) popularized the collective action problem, or how common interests by 
themselves do not suffice to generate collective mobilization if undermined by 
individual incentives. In dissent, the costs of participation are borne by each 
individual and potentially very high, while any benefits to action are collective and 
non-excludable to non-participants. As such, common grievances and the potential 
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benefits from successful efforts are not sufficient to elicit individual participation in 
collective mobilization, and individuals will generally have incentives to free-ride on 
the contributions of others rather than participate in dissent. 
There is an extensive body of research that examines how the collective action 
problem can be overcome and what may convince people to participate in dissent, 
despite the lack of clear individual incentives (see, in particular, Lichbach 1995). 
Perhaps most prominent is the resource mobilization school, which argues that 
various structural factors facilitate mobilization. This includes political factors such as 
a more liberal political regime that constitute a more permissive environment, social 
and economic resources for mobilization such as higher human capital and individual 
skills, or more developed social capital including pre-existing organizations or better 
established networks that help make it easier to coordinate large scale contentious 
collective action (see, e.g., Andrews and Biggs 2006; Gamson 1975; Gamson et al. 
1992; Marx and Wood 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Snow et al. 
1980; Zald and McCarthy 1979). But as discussed above for motivation, the similar 
initial social and economic conditions implies that resources per does not provide 
leverage to explain why initial low-level mobilization turned into a major protest 
campaigns against government in the FBiH whereas major mobilization did not 
follow after the initial protests in RS. 
A more promising alternative lies in how the interaction between dissidents 
and the authorities shape the subsequent growth or quelling of incipient political 
mobilization. Social movement research generally argues that extra-institutional 
contentious collective action grows as a result of the interactions between non-state 
actors and the state. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007: 92), for example, “in most 
of such (major protest) cycles, contention begins moderately and in interaction with 
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institutions”. Extra-institutional protests aims to produce political change and actors 
are particularly likely to resort to direct action methods when they believe that 
changes cannot be obtained through regular institutional political channels or 
conventional politics. Irregular political dissent typically arises from small, local 
networks of people that know each other. However, the growth of contentious 
collective action from initial mobilization often arises through more encompassing 
social networks with a sufficient of loosely connected individuals and organizations, 
i.e., the strength of weak ties phenomenon (Granovetter 1978; McAdam 2003; Tarrow 
1994; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Following specific interactions among mobilized 
social actors and the authorities, we may see an “upward scale shift” across space and 
sectors of the society, ultimately leading to much higher mobilization and more 
intense and geographically diffused contentious activity (see Tarrow 1994; Tilly and 
Tarrow 2007).2 
Whether we get an upward scale shift or not ultimately depends on the extent 
of individual participation in a collective action, which again raises the collective 
action problem of net collective gains versus individual rationality (see Oberschall 
1973). In general, individuals will normally be reluctant to contribute alone unless 
they have private incentives, or alternatively, something changes expectations that 
your own decision to participate is likely to affect others. Klandermans (1984) points 
                                                 
2 Tilly and Tarrow (2007:95) argue that “[u]pward scale shift is one of the most 
significant processes in contentious politics. It moves contention beyond its local 
origins, touches on the interest and values of new actors, involves a shift of venue to 
sites where contention may be more or less successful, and can threaten other actors 
or entire regimes”.  
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to how expectations about the ability to change existing social and political conditions 
through protests shape individual willingness to participate following initial events. 
Thus, government responses to initial protest can thus further reinforce or actually 
change individual expectations about the effectiveness of contentious action based on 
your beliefs that your participation will make a difference and help foster 
mobilization.  
Much of the existing literature on the evolution of mobilization has focused on 
repressive responses. There is a clear consensus that dissent perceived to constitute a 
threat is likely to generate repressive state responses, but much less agreement over 
the consequences of repression for dissent or mobilization (see Davenport 2007). As 
summarized by Rasler (1996, 133), existing research finds that “… repression has 
both positive and negative effects on government opposition”. Some argue that 
government repression increases subsequent dissident through perceptions of injustice 
and outrage (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan 2008, 2011; Francisco 1995; Kocher et al. 
2011; Piazza and Walsh 2010), while others find that repression tends to successfully 
deter and decrease dissent and impede the ability of the opposition to mobilize (see 
Downes 2008; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Some 
scholars have argued for more complex non-liner relationships, for example that 
large-scale repression deters future dissent while lower level repression may fuel 
grievances and mobilization (e.g., Khawaja 1993, Muller and Weede 1990; Olivier 
1991).  
One limitation in many studies of repression is the lack of attention to other 
possible government response and how these affect mobilization. Accommodation is 
typically treated implicitly, as one of several alternatives that may happen in the 
absence of repression. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Wucherpfenning (2017) find 
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evidence that reforms by government reduce the likelihood of ethnic violent conflict 
or promote conflict termination, but many concessions fall short of what dissidents 
seek and can also potentially encourage beliefs that greater concessions can be won 
through further mobilization in active conflict (e.g., Cederman et al. 2015).3 In some 
cases, accommodation may be selective, to specific demands, and reflect efforts by 
governments to divide movements (see Cunningham 2011). In other cases, 
governments simultaneously combine repressive and accommodative policies as a 
response to unrest in general or to particular tactics (see, e.g., Cunningham and 
Beaulieu 2010; Lichbach 1987: 267). Government repression and 
accommodation/concessions are not mutually exclusive responses, and the 
government is not always unified around a clear response or speak with one voice 
(Lichbach 1987). At the extreme, inconsistent responses can both raise expectations 
of concessions or efficacy through protest while increasing grievances over 
repression. Thus, the contradictory findings in existing research on the relationships 
between government responses and mobilization arises from not considering the full 
range of government responses.  
Few existing studies take into account the role of contradictory government 
responses, where we see both repression and concessions by government, how this 
affects the subsequent evolution of dissent. One important exception is Rasler (1996), 
who analyzes government repression and concessions and protest escalation in the 
Iranian revolution. The limited availability of detailed or disaggregated protest event 
data has prevent broader comparative empirical studies, and most studies have been 
                                                 
3 Of course, concessions may also be a result of prior dissent or accommodation (see 
Cedermant et al. 2015; Thomas 2014). 
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forced to rely on aggregated annual counts, without detailed information on the 
responses of governments to specific individual events. By contrast, our study offers a 
new dataset of the protest in Bosnia and Herzegovina with daily coding of protests 
events and government responses. These allow us to consider the number of 
participants in events as a measure of mobilization intensity at a much more 
disaggregated level and introduce variation in government responses across two 
different jurisdictions within the same country, thus plausibly holding a number of 
other potential factors constant when making comparisons, given the overall strong 
structural similarities across different regions in the country. We expand below on our 
propositions on how differences government responses can shape subsequent 
mobilization and explain the divergent patterns in the two jurisdictions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
 
Explaining the divergent mobilization in FBiH and RS 
In line with Klandermans’ (1984) expectancy-value theory, we argue that government 
responses to initial protest shape individual expectations about the ability and 
effectiveness of foster social and political change through protests and thus their 
willingness to participate. The grievances that motivated the protests were widely 
shared throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the subsequent government 
responses influenced people’s views on whether protests would be effective or not, 
thus shaping individual willingness to participate. We first substantiate the common 
appeal of the protest, before turning to factors affecting perceptions of efficacy and 
individual willingness to participate.  
Beyond the material basis for widespread grievances in terms of severe social, 
economic and political motives such as poverty, corruption and unemployment 
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present throughout all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the widespread appeal of the 
protest is borne out by opinion survey. The Klix (2014) survey mentioned above 
indicated that a clear majority supported the protest in both entities, with 93% of 
respondents in FBiH expressing support and 78% in favor in the RS. The appeal of 
the protest was also bolstered by their largely non-violent nature. Although the initial 
protest events by workers in former-state owned companies included some displays of 
disorder such as a series of buildings set on fire, the movement generally managed to 
contain violence and prevent further escalation of isolated lower-level violence. This 
is important for a number of reasons. First, it has been showed that nonviolent direct 
action has generally lower barriers to increasing participation, as it does not require 
specific skills of or extensive training, and does not require overcoming moral barriers 
as resort to the use of violence often entails. As such, nonviolent dissent can in 
principle attract a much larger number of participants and more quickly than violent 
dissent (see Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Dahl et al 2016). Second, violence can 
often crowd out participation. Indeed, more than half of the respondents in the Klix 
(2014) survey said that they would stop supporting the anti-government protests in the 
event that violence were to become widespread.4 
                                                 
4 Some prior research has conceived of government consistency in terms of responses 
to particular tactics and how this affects tactic choice by dissidents, e.g., violent or 
non-violent strategies (see Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). This is interesting in its 
own right, but in our view less relevant to the 2014 BiH protests, where there was no 
organized violence and resort to large-scaled organized violence would not have been 
feasible over the relatively short period. Thus the main strategic issue for the dissident 
movement was to control incidental violence or fighting with security forces. 
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There is also evidence of both accommodation and repression to the anti-
government protest wave. In the FBiH we observe both of these at the same time, as 
the government on the one hand expressed a great deal of sympathy with the motives 
of the protests, while at the same time condemned the disruptive effects of the protest 
and calling for the protest activities to cease “for the good of the country”. For 
example, when over 10 000 people took to the streets in Tuzla, Sarajevo and other key 
towns in FBiH on 7 February 2014, 4 Cantonal prime ministers and 43 government 
officials of the FBiH resigned (Sladojević and Lingo-Demirović 2014). We believe 
that this highlighted to the protesters the possible efficacy of nonviolent protest 
against political elites and encouraged further mobilization. At the same time, the 
government also engaged in acts of repression, as they sought to ban protest activities 
and threatened severe sanctions against individuals taking parts in protests, including 
5 year prison sentences for terrorism (see Sladojević and Lingo-Demirović 2014).  
We posit that the key element for understanding the different mobilizations 
trajectories in the FBiH and in RS over the January-April 2014 period stem from 
divergent government responses and how these shaped expectations about the 
efficacy of protest to obtain desired political outcomes and the prospects for large-
scale mobilization. Irrespective of how valuable a collective good is, individuals will 
have little incentive to participate if they do not expect participation to be successful 
or that their individual participation will have some influence. Thus, government 
responses can shape mobilization in positive and negative ways. Although individuals 
do not precisely know what will happen, they develop expectations about their ability 
to obtain desired policy outcomes throughout dissident activities based on how the 
state reacts to contentious political behavior. 
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The 2014 protest wave originated in the common economic quagmire of 
postwar BiH, but the initial events in FBiH changed expectations about the prospects 
for success. The workers at a pharmaceutical plant in Tuzla who filed lawsuits in 
2011 after not receiving salaries or access to health care for months managed to enlist 
the support and participation of other workers in former state owned companies, and 
the legal struggle evolved into coordinated nonviolent protests and occupations. Until 
the beginning of 2014, however, the courts did not rule on any of the lawsuits, and the 
Tuzla Cantonal court strongly condemned workers for engaging in unlawful acts of 
civil disobedience actions such as street blockage (Bhprotestfiles 2014). In January 
2014, when the national courts finally ruled in favor of their lawsuit, there was a 
legitimizing push to the workers’ demands and the subsequent protest activities.5  
This concession, we argue, led the potential mobilizers to update their beliefs 
and expectations on the efficacy of extra-institutional contentious for political and 
social change and increase their willingness to participate. From 5 to 8 February 2014, 
the numbers of protesters increased by thousands, and the demonstrations spread to 
many of the main cities of the FBiH and RS, including Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar and 
Bihac, Banja Luka, Prijedor.6 In the FBiH, the police met protesters with increasing 
violence, and dissent became increasingly confrontational, including storming and 
setting fire to government buildings. The protests lead to the resignation of many 
local authorities. Leading political figures lent support for the legitimacy of the 
campaign, including the President of the FBiH Živko Budimir, who said that “social 
                                                 
5 See documentary at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NwDIW3wBDY.  
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LjLiFhtR8t0 ; DefenceWeb, 10 February 2014. 
Bosnia rocked by spreading anti-government unrest. 
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uprising in the BiH has been on the horizon for years, it was only a matter of time 
before it would escalate” (DL.O. 2014). However, these statements stood in stark 
contrast to the repressive reactions of the police forces on the ground (DL.O. 2014).  
We believe that inconsistent responses in FBiH, mixing repressive and 
accommodative behaviors, helped highlight enduring grievances and encourage 
further non-violent mobilization, and also indicated the possible efficacy of protest to 
citizens and social networks in FBiH. By contrast, the initial mobilization in RS was 
met exclusively with repression by government officials, including threats of 
imprisonment, fines, and efforts to discredit the protests. The President of the RS, 
Milorad Dodik, actively sought to discredit protesters by calling them traitors and 
rabble-rousers, and argued that the primary aim of protesters was the destruction of 
the RS (Jukić 2014). Furthermore, President Dodik even dared to challenge the 
criticisms of the government voiced by former soldiers in the RS, a group which had 
been previously generally supportive of the RS institutions since the end of the civil 
war (Jukić 2014). These consistently repressive government reactions likely lowered 
the perceptions of individuals in the RS that protest could be effective, and thus 
ultimately undermined individual willingness to participate in the wake of the initial 
events. 
Figure 1 below summarizes out argument that that FBiH government’s 
inconsistent repressive and accommodative behavior increased the value of collective 
dissent through individual expectations about the ability to generate social and 
political change through contentious collective action and a higher willingness to 
participate. By contrast, the RS government’s consistent repressive behaviors 
decreased the expected efficacy of protest activities, thereby decreasing the individual 
willingness to participate in the anti-government campaign and undermining the 
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growth of extra-institutional contention activities. As we do not observe the same 
government response inconsistency in RS as in the FBiH, we never reach the 
subsequent stage in the flow diagram.  
 
Figure 1: Government Inconsistency and Mobilization  
 
 
In the following section, we present new data on participation in primarily 
non-violent contentious collective activities in BiH in 2014 and then use these data to 
test our argument.  
 
 
Data on the 2014 protests and government responses 
We have collected daily protest event data on the 2014 protests in BiH, drawing on 
two databases of daily news reports, one based on English language sources and 
another based on local sources. The local reports on the incidents in BiH far 
outnumber the coverage in English language sources, and they thus provide for a 
much more detailed database than just relying on foreign media sources. We have 
used the LexisNexis database to extract news items from English-language sources, 
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including among others The Guardian, Agence Presse France, BBC, and Reuters.7 
We have used the INFOBIRO database to extract local daily news reports from 
digitized local sources including Nezavisne, Oslobodjenje, Dnevni Avaz, Danevni 
List. 8  Moreover, the local sources are diverse both in terms of orientation and 
geographic origins. In the FBiH, Oslobodjenje and Dnevni Avaz are based in the BiH 
capital of Sarajevo and Dnevni List is based in Mostar, while Nezavisne Novine is 
based in Banjaluka, the capital of the RS entity. Appendix 1 provides a complete list 
with the number of items extracted by the individual sources. The audience and the 
monthly newspaper circulation differ. Oslobodjenje and Dnevni Avaz are mainly read 
by Bosniaks in the FBiH, Dnevni List by Croats and Bosniaks in FBiH and Nezavisne 
Novine by the Serb population in the RS. 
We used a search string of key words intended to capture protest related 
articles from the electronic sources. The full set of the keywords used are listed in 
Appendix 1. Based on these we first retrieved all potentially relevant articles for the 
period 1 January 2014 to 30 April 2014, and then apply manual inspection and the 
more detailed classification scheme. The majority of the protest events and 
government responses occurred in the month of February, and our data thus covers 
the entire cycle of the 2014 protest. We focus our analyses on the effects of 
government responses to that period. Figure 2 displays the recorded daily events by 
canton to illustrate the variation across the country. Figure 3 displays the recorded 
number or protesting individuals by canton. Finally, Figure 4 displays the BiH 
                                                 
7 See http://www.lexisnexis.com. 
8 See http://www.infobiro.ba/. 
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territorial and administrative structure with the location of the cantons of the FBiH 
and the RS.  
 











Figure 4: Cantons of FBiH and the RS (source: 
http://asusilc.net/scr101/les1/bosna1.jpg). 
 
In our analyses below we treat government responses from each jurisdiction as 
a single unit, i.e., the FBiH and RS respectively. Note that beyond the separation 
between the two governments or jurisdictions, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a 
federal unit and the local regions/cantons have limited autonomy or repressive power. 
Hence, there is little basis for trying to examine variations across regions based on 
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differences in responses from local authorities, and we believe that individuals 
primarily responded to what they see as the central government. In line with our 
argument, the complex composition of the government also implies that inconsistency 
can arise as a result of the actions of different individuals rather than changes in the 
position of a unified executive per se.9  
Whereas public displays of grievances such as strikes and demonstrations 
dominated during the month of February, efforts to organize indoor assembly 
meetings called “plenums” become more common in the following months. In our 
data we do not code these plenums as protest events. They do not constitute public 
challenges through direct action, given the indoor nature of the event. Moreover, the 
lack of news coverage makes it more difficult to adequately track the number of 
plenum participants. Finally, the move from street protest to these popular assemblies, 
held to be “open to all citizens”, in our view illustrate the regularization of dissent 
after the peak of protest mobilization towards conventional political action, which 
contrasts with the more spontaneous nature of the initial protest wave. These 
assemblies were formed primarily to let participants formulate in a more structured 
way claims against state institutions and political leaders as the initial irregular protest 
momentum was fading away (De Noni 2014).  
Our database also contains information on the mode of actions that protesters 
engaged in (i.e., whether clearly nonviolent or violent), the specific tactics used in the 
event (e.g., occupation, demonstration), the location where the event took place, 
recording the specific cities/towns as well as the canton and/or entity, and finally the 
                                                 




government responses observed in the aftermath of the event and whether this was 
repressive or accommodative. We also identify the institutional source of repressive 
and accommodative behaviors, i.e. government at the municipal, cantonal, entity or 
national level. Our data also identify various types of contentious collective action 
(threatening authorities with protests, direct democratic action, confrontational action, 
violent action, decision/call to stop protest action, pro-government protest action), 
with several sublevels used to determine the particular action type (see Appendix 2). 
Similarly, the variables coding government response – GOVERNMENT_repression 
and GOVERNMENT_concession – have several different indicators. Both, 
GOVERNMENT_repression and GOVERNMENT_concession are coded as 
categorical, ordinal variables where a value of 2 represents high levels of repression 
and concession respectively, 1-low levels, 0-no repression/no concession (see 
Appendix 2 for full details). 
To code inconsistency in government responses and test its impact on 
subsequent protests events, we examined whether we see repression, concessions, or a 
mixture of both during the same day or period. In our raw data, the variable 
GOVERNMENT_inconsistency takes a value of 0 if the response is consistent and 
the government uses only repression or only concession during a particular day, or 
neither, and the variable is assigned a value of 1 indicating inconsistency if the 
government used both repression and concession on the same day. In our analyses 
below we generally aggregate the coding of inconsistency for combinations of 
concessions and repressions over longer windows of several days. We also combine 
high and low repression in the analyses. given the small number of available data 
points to conduct separate analyses to distinguish variation in the relative balance or 
degree of mixes towards more or less repressive and accommodative inconsistent 
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responses. Figure 5 displays the distribution of government responses at the daily 
level. As can be see, the modal category is no direct response, but clear concessions 
are more common than repression only for cases where we observe a direct response. 
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of government responses to protest. 
 
While concessions are somewhat more common overall, we see a clear 
differentiation between the two administrative units of BiH. The RS government has 
mainly responded to protest activities by discrediting participants in FBiH and 
actively ignoring protests in the RS. By contrast, the FBiH government has used 
highly repressive tactics, such as beatings, imprisonment and terrorist charges for the 
protesters that allegedly participated in burning of the government buildings in 
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Sarajevo, but also used a wide range of accommodative tactics ranging from the 
release of political prisoners, reshuffling of administrative personnel, resignations, 
investigations into corrupt officials, meeting with protesters to hear their demands, 
announcing social reforms and legal measures, and changing electoral laws among 
many others.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
We have argued that differences in government responses and their impact on 
individual expectations can help account for the differences in the protest 
mobilization trends between the RS and FBiH. This claim is difficult to test explicitly 
in the case of RS, because it relies on a counterfactual, or something that we do not 
observe. In other words, we observe only repression and no accommodation to 
protests in the RS, and hence no inconsistent behavior that could have motivated 
people to increase participation in protest. However, we can evaluate the implications 
of the argument by looking at variation over time in protests in the FBiH. Figure 6 
shows the daily number of protest participants in the FBiH. If our argument is correct, 






Figure 6: Daily number of protest participants in FBiH. 
 
To evaluate this, we use the raw data described above to create a daily data set 
of all events and the recorded number of protests in all of the FBiH. We only examine 
the aggregate number of participants here, since most of the government responses are 
not specific to particular cantons. Our data contain a number of very small protest 
events, but most protesters participated in a few very large events, which seem 
qualitatively different. We believe that the number of protestors provide the most 
appropriate test for our argument on mobilization escalation. When events are highly 
aggregated, the correlation between total participation and event frequency is 
generally low or modest, and the findings from one measure do not generally extend 
to the other measure (see Biggs 2016). However, we also provide robustness tests 
with the number of protest events, which potentially may better reflect growth in the 
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geographical scope of mobilization. Figure 7 shows the distribution of distinct protest 
events by day for the FBiH. Although the first peak coincides for events and 
participants, the number of events per se cannot distinguish between the events with 
limited and very high participation. 
 
Figure 7: Daily number of protest events in the FBiH. 
 
To examine inconsistency in government responses we look at the prior three 
days, and we code government responses as inconsistent if we see both repressive and 
accommodative responses over the period. The logic of looking at the prior three days 
is that we expect the expectations to enter with some lag. In order to know about an 
event, individuals would need to see reports (which typically emerge the following 
day) and then prepare for participation. A window of three days should be sufficient 
to capture the impact of inconsistency on participation.  
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 To evaluate our claim we first conduct a series of regressions with the logged 
number of daily protests in Table 1. We use the logged number of participants, since 
the number of participants is measured in thousands for many days, We use OLS 
rather than a count model, since the latter typically is better suited for moderate 
counts. As can be seen, we find a large positive coefficient in Model 1 in Table 1, 
indicating higher participation following inconsistent behavior, consistent with our 
claim that inconsistent behavior served to both highlight existing grievances as well 
as changing expectations about the opportunities for concessions in FBiH.  
Model 2 in Table 1 adds a time trend to the model in order to consider whether 
the inconsistent behavior may simply reflect some secular trend where the 
government responses became more erratic over time. As can be seen, we find no 
simple linear trend in these data, and our estimate of inconsistency is not affected. 
Finally, to ensure that increased participation does not reflect accurate expectations 
about repression and accommodation we add a term indicating whether events 
ultimately are repressed or accommodated. As can be seen, both of these terms are 
positive, indicating a possible endogenous relationship where events with higher 
participation are more likely to receive a response from the government. However, 
they do not change the sign or significance for past inconsistency, thus indicating that 




Table 1: Regression of log protestors 
Dependent variable: 
Log protesters 
(1) (2) (3) 
Government inconsistency (past) 4.177*** 4.140*** 3.119*** 
(0.706) (0.837) (0.762) 
Time 0.002 -0.013 
(0.021) (0.019) 
Repression (current) 2.393*** 
(0.860) 
Concessions (current) 2.091** 
(0.916) 
Constant 0.550 0.506 0.330 
(0.481) (0.718) (0.618) 
Observations 69 69 69 
R2 0.343 0.343 0.542 
Adjusted R2 0.333 0.323 0.513 
Residual Std. Error 2.926 (df = 67) 2.948 (df = 66) 2.500 (df = 64) 
F Statistic 35.0*** (1; 67) 17.2*** (2; 66) 18.9*** (4; 64) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Table 2 repeats the previous analysis with the number of events rather than 
protestors. The results are similar in quantitative sense, although the effects are more 
muted, possibly as a result of counting locations rather than the scaled magnitude of 
events. Using shorter/longer windows of one/five days for inconsistency yield 
qualitative similar results. Alternative estimates using a negative binomial model of 
the number of events also yield substantively similar results. Hence, we conclude that 
our argument seems supported by the variation over events and over time, regardless 




Table 2: Regression of log events  
Dependent variable: 
Log events 
(1) (2) (3) 
Government inconsistency (past) 0.871*** 0.774*** 0.413** 
(0.168) (0.197) (0.156) 
Time 0.005 0.002 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Repression (current) 0.436** 
(0.176) 
Concessions (current) 0.885*** 
(0.188) 
Constant 0.277** 0.160 0.074 
(0.114) (0.169) (0.127) 
Observations 69 69 69 
R2 0.287 0.297 0.629 
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.275 0.606 
Residual Std. Error 0.695 (df = 67) 0.695 (df = 66) 0.513 (df = 64) 
F Statistic 27.0*** (1; 67) 13.9*** (2; 66) 27.1 *** (4; 64) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The protests in BiH in 2014 are interesting for a number of reasons. First, they 
illustrate that economic marginalization and poor governance can create common 
grievances and mobilization, even in deeply ethnically divided societies with 
pervasive mistrust (see Alesina and LaFerrara 2002). The 2014 wave of anti-
government protests indicates that common cross-ethnic social problems and political 
ineffectiveness actually can unite individuals across ethnic lines, even if Serbs 
participated to a lesser extent as the protest did not grow to the same extent in the RS 
as in the FBiH.  
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Second, we believe that the special case of an administratively divided state 
with similar political and economic conditions in the two units, i.e., the FBiH and RS, 
provides an interesting laboratory for studying variation in government responses and 
the effects on mobilization. Despite similar initial economic conditions, the FBiH saw 
major contentious collective action, while the unrest did not extend to the RS. We 
have argued that that the consistent repressive tactics by the RS government and 
inconsistent responses by the FBiH account for the differences in mobilization across 
the two entities. Our findings are in line with Lichbach’s (1987) model that suggests 
that consistent government responses, whether repressive or accommodative actions, 
can reduce dissent, while inconsistent government responses seem to signal to people 
that change is possible, and may increase individual willingness to participate and join 
others in dissent (see also Klandermans 1984). Our highly disaggregated database on 
the 2014 protest in BiH allow for a more direct test of these argument on how 
collective action is shaped by government responses.  
With regards to policy implications, our results could be interpreted in a very 
negative sense as providing support for the effectiveness of preemptive repressive 
tactics used in the RS, and the perils of combining attempts to contain protest with 
efforts to provide at least some recognition of the concerns of the protesters. While we 
may deplore these implications from a perspective emphasizing justice or reform, it is 
hard to deny that perceived repression often can be effective and deter dissent. This, 
however, does not mean that dissent can never yield political change or that all efforts 
to mobilize over grievances are necessarily futile. All societies have vulnerabilities, 
and organized dissident, with large numbers of potential supporters with common 
grievances can find them (see Chenoweth and Stepan 2011). The mobilization against 
Milosević in Serbia had to go through a series of failures before finally achieving 
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success (see Popović 2014). Thus, the protest events should serve as a signal to the 
politicians the national level in BiH and both entities that the plight of people should 
not be ignored, and that protest can arise even when the odds are against and take a 
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Appendix 1: Search keywords 
 
protest mutiny rebellion strike strikes tear gas spring riots rock protesters 
demonstrators demobilized soldier unemployed unemployment aggrieved 
privatization burning plenum assemblies resignation corruption religious leaders of 
the Interreligious Council Inter-religious Council Radmanovic Izetbegovic 
KomsicDodikRadmanovicCovic Izetbegovic KomsicDodikFincija Ceric Puljic Finns 
Ceric Puljic Bishop Metropolitan Presidency Incko 
 
Table A1. Total Number of published articles by publication for local sources 
 
 January February March April 
Oslobodjenje 528 573 564 587 
DnevniAvaz 498 495 616 564 
Dnevni List 327 317 357 357 















Appendix 2: Data structure example, with variables and values 
 
Table B1: Data structure example 
Protest 
_City/Town CantonID Entity Date 
Protest 
_Action Gov.Lev. Gov.Rep Gov.Con 
N 
_protesters
Tuzla 3 FBIH 2014-02-06 violent 
cantonal; 
entity 2 2 6000 
Tuzla 3 FBIH 2014-02-07 violent 
local; 
cantonal 2 1 10000 
Sarajevo 9 FBIH 2014-02-09 nonviolent entity 2 1 1000 
Sarajevo 9 FBIH 2014-02-10 nonviolent entity 0 2 5000 
Banja Luka 0 RS 2014-02-07 nonviolent none 0 0 300 
Banja Luka 0 RS 2014-02-08 nonviolent none 0 0 300 





Table B2. GOVERNMENT_repression values 
 None 
 No attempt to repress 
 Low-level repression  
 Block/deviate marches  
 Discredit (public speeches, interviews, statements, explicitly 
saying that they do not want to give up their positions)  
 Threats 
 Investigations into activists (personal and public activities)  
 Refusing to meet demands 
 
 High-levels repression 
 Physical, non-lethal intervention/violations of physical integrity 
rights (beatings, police raids, throwing tear gas)  
 Banning Protests  
 Restricting individual’s civil rights (right to fair trial) 
 Imprisonment (imprisonment as a consequence of activism)  





Table B3. GOVERNMENT_concession values 
0. None 
 No attempts to concede  
1. Low-level concession 
 Symbolic actions of conceding (ex. of security forces 
deciding to put down their armour, take off their protective 
gear).  
 Admitting that the situation in the country is difficult-
sympathizing with protesters 
 Release of political prisoners  
 Pardons/amnesties  
 Reshuffling of administrative personnel 
 Arrest of controversial government figures (Investigations into 
corrupt and illegal activities by the government officials)  
 Addressing protesters in the public squares, on the streets 
 Offering to reduce salaries of political officials 
 Recognizing people right to protests  
2. High-level concession, expressing willingness to accommodate 
the demands:  
 Call upon parliamentary debate on the protesters' demands  
 Meeting of political leaders, religious leaders and elites to find a 
common ground 
 Appointment of government figures advocating for social justice 
and equality 
 Announcement of social reforms and legal measures (regardless 
of the implementation, ex. in domestic sources— D2_Nezavisne 
Novine_2014-02-01) 
 Changing the electoral law to have early elections to address 
protester demands 
 






Table b4, PROTESTER_action_type values 
1. Threatening authorities with mass protests 
2. Direct democratic actions (legal) 
 demanding referendum/early elections 
 collecting signatures/petitioning/sending letters of protest  
 mass meetings (plenums)  
 attending meetings of cantonal/city assemblies  
3. Confrontational protest actions  
 Boycotts 
 Strikes  
 Defying bans on demonstrations and gatherings 
 Blockades of streets and public spaces 
 Self-mutilation/hunger-strike 
 Vigils/picketing/other symbolic acts () 
 Demanding a release of imprisoned activists  
 Demanding resignation of government officials  
4.  Violent protest actions  
 Burning/damaging state insignia  
 Damaging public property (throwing stones, paint, breaking 
windows)  
 Threats of bombing state property 
 Physical fights with security forces 
 Physical fights with civilians  
 Sabotage (electronic/cyber attacks)  
 Damaging private property 
 Clashes with police 
 Detaining government officials 
 
5. Decision to stop protest activities  
 Protester leaders/representatives calling off protest activities saying 
that their demands were met  
 
6. Pro-government protests  
 
NA. Missing data (no available information)  
 
 
